One Year On, There Is A New Dilemma: Can there be UNSC Cooperation over Syria?

By Dr Kasia A. Houghton:

When Bashar al-Assad’s regime finally collapsed a year ago on 8^th December 2024, the world witnessed what many believed impossible: the end of one of the Middle East’s most enduring authoritarian dynasties. For the first time in more than a decade, diplomats dared to imagine a Syria no longer defined by stalemate, siege, and geopolitical paralysis. Over the course of the Syrian conflict the UNSC was divided over how to deal with al-Assad; often paralysing the world’s most powerful multilateral forum. With al-Assad now gone, could this be an opportunity for UNSC cooperation over Syria and international action towards it?

But less than a year later, the international optimism surrounding Syria’s transition has given way to a far more complicated reality—one centred not on al-Assad’s legacy, but on the choices of the man who replaced him: Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former jihadist militia leader turned transitional president.

Since coming to power, al-Sharaa has embarked on an international charm offensive to gain the support and recognition of the international community and the legitimacy needed to stay in power. This culminated in early November, with the UNSC’s decision to remove Ahmed al-Sharaa and former HTS commander and interior minister, Anas Khattab, from sanctions targeting proponents of terrorist groups ISIS and Al-Qaida. Fourteen members of the council voted in favour, while China abstained. Al-Sharaa’s 10^th November visit to Washington, the first of any Syrian leader since 1946, was designed to reassure the world that Syria is ready to mend long-broken bridges and rejoin the international community. Syria, having been in the fold of anti-US alliances since the Cold War could now be a less divisive actor in the international system.

The P5 states—China, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—agree that Syria has changed, but they do not all agree on whether the new government represents an opportunity or a risk too great to ignore. At issue is not merely al-Sharaa’s past leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. It is his decision, in the chaotic months after al-Assad’s fall, to integrate around 3,500 foreign fighters, many of whom were Uyghur—primarily members of the internationally proscribed Turkistan Islamic Party—into the Syrian military. In the internal logic of Syria’s transition, the move was understandable: these fighters were experienced, cohesive, and capable of stabilizing fronts that might otherwise have collapsed. But geopolitically, it could be an insurmountable obstacle to UNSC endorsement of Syria’s new government.

China: The Reluctant Veto Power

For China, the issue of Uyghur militants is not negotiable. Beijing’s counterterrorism doctrine has long defined any armed Uyghur group operating abroad as a direct national-security threat. So, when it was reported in June that al-Sharaa would integrate these fighters within Syria’s transitional brigades, China saw something deeper than wartime improvisation: a state-sanctioned harbour for militants it considers existential enemies. It was therefore no surprise that Beijing declined to recognise al-Sharaa’s government until recently and quietly blocked early UNSC discussions about easing sanctions.

China is suspicious of al-Sharaa’s intentions; the counterterrorism focus of the Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s first meeting with Chinese officials in Beijing in mid-November clearly demonstrates this. The Chinese foreign ministry expressed hope that the Syrian government would remove “security obstacles to the stable development of China-Syria relations”. However, despite promising that Syrian territory would not be used to undermine Chinese interests, speculations about whether Syria would return 400 Uyghur fighters to China were debunked by Damascus. Nonetheless, the Syrian and Chinese foreign ministers reaffirmed their support for territorial claims to the Golan Heights and Taiwan and hopes for collaboration towards reconstruction and economic development were ignited. But, whether these promises for economic aid and investment remain just that likely depends on the Syrian governments willingness and ability to reverse course on the integration of Uyghur foreign fighters.

For a Council accustomed to paralysis under al-Assad, it is a bitter irony: now that the dictator is gone, a degree of gridlock persists—just centred on a new issue. This is in considerable contrast to China’s engagement with al-Assad’s Syria, which was diplomatically shielded by Beijing, admitted into China’s Belt and Road Initiative in January 2022, and benefitted from several large reconstruction contracts.

The United States: Hopeful, But Not Blind

The United States has taken a strikingly different view. To Washington, al-Sharaa’s ascent—despite his origins—is preferable to al-Assad’s indefinite survival. The Trump administration sees in him a leader capable of negotiating the post-conflict setting. Obstacles set by hard red lines prevented US investment in reconstruction under al-Assad. Despite al-Sharaa’s former al-Qaeda affiliation, Syria’s new leadership appears to come with less normative and bureaucratic baggage, at least for the time being, with the US having removed and paused sanctions on Syria and its new leadership. US Special Envoy to Syria, and Ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, noted that there is “no plan B” when it comes to leadership in Syria, and has expressed frustration with Israel’s spoiler attacks on Syria. Washington’s pragmatic stance towards the Syria’s new ex-jihadist leadership is clear.

In private, U.S. officials acknowledge that al-Sharaa’s reliance on former foreign fighters is problematic. But they also understand that a transitional government emerging from total institutional collapse cannot demobilise its strongest units overnight. It seems that for Washington, stability must precede reform.

Washington wants to rebuild a coherent UN approach to Syria. But it cannot do so without Beijing.

Russia: No Longer a Spoiler, But Not a Savior

Having backed al-Assad throughout the conflict, including militarily, Russia’s volte-face, from seeking the outright dismantling of HTS to a desire to establish pragmatic relations, is stark. Nonetheless, it offers a new opportunity for the US and Russia to also pragmatically cooperate over Syria, having been at loggerheads for the duration of its long and violent conflict.

Al-Assad was Moscow’s stake in the conflict, a stake Washington sought to remove. But, under pressure from an escalation with Ukraine in the immediate period before the rebel offensive that saw the Assad regime’s collapse, the Kremlin had no appetite to invest further resources and energy in defending the crumbling regime. Russia’s posture has changed dramatically since al-Assad’s fall. While Moscow once acted as Damascus’s diplomatic shield, it no longer has a client to protect. Instead, it has moved toward cautious pragmatism.

Al-Sharaa’s July and October visits with Kremlin officials made this clear. In October, al-Sharaa thanked Russia for its continued shipments of food, oil, and currency support, but also sought to redefine the relationship on sovereign terms. The Kremlin, in turn, petitioned to keep its Assad-era military bases and continue limited economic assistance, but stopped short of full political endorsement.

Russia can complicate Syria diplomacy, but it is no longer committed to blocking compromise. China, not Russia, is now the decisive veto player.

France: A New Mediator in a Turbulent Transition

France has been particularly swift in welcoming and engaging with Syria’s new leaders. The first Western powers to visit Damascus was a French-German diplomatic mission less than a month after the Assad government fell; this was three days before their United States counterparts visited the Syrian capital. Since then, Paris has been an active mediator in resolving disputes between the new central government and Israel, as well as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Paris’s central role in facilitating negotiations towards the integration of the SDF into the national military, as well as discussions about Israeli de-escalation towards Syria indicates its support for Syria’s transition.

The United Kingdom: A Cautious Supporter of Transition

The United Kingdom remained steadfastly against the former Syrian regime, and engagement with the new transitional leadership has been growing. While asset freezes and sanctions had been lifted by the UK government in late April, it was not until July that the Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, met with the Syrian leadership in Damascus. Further normalisation came after the UK revoked HTS’s designation as a terrorist organisation in October. Despite the UK’s relatively delayed direct engagement with al-Sharaa, London has continuously engaged in multilateral efforts to support Syria’s transition, marking a stark contrast to its former Syria policy.

The UNSC’s New Landscape

Al-Assad’s removal has reordered the dynamics inside the Security Council. On one side, it seems that Russia, the United States, and Europe want structured engagement with Damascus and are prepared to support phased sanctions relief. Russia also seeks guaranteed influence but is open to negotiation. China, for now, sees major risks, and is cautious about pursuing opportunities for cooperation with al-Sharaa’s Syria.

This shift creates a paradox. After more than ten years of disagreement over al-Assad, the Council finally has a chance to rebuild consensus—and yet consensus is still out of reach, for reasons al-Assad himself has little to do with.

The Challenge Ahead for Al-Sharaa

Syria’s transitional government’s political challenge is therefore two-fold. The first is to stabilize Syria internally. Al-Sharaa must hold together a coalition of armed factions, civic movements, technocrats, and tribal authorities without repeating al-Assad’s authoritarianism, which sealed his demise, or losing control. The foreign fighters al-Sharaa integrated give him leverage. Removing them too quickly could unravel that coalition.

The second is to reassure China. Beijing wants a clear plan: a timetable for demobilizing Uyghur fighters; independent verification of counterterrorism measures; and assurances that Syria will not become a sanctuary for militants targeting Chinese interests. Yet these demands cut against al-Sharaa’s internal needs, as alienating the units that secured his rise. But he cannot gain international legitimacy and the benefits of a united Security Council without addressing China’s fears.

This is a central dilemma of Syria’s transition.

Can UNSC Cooperation over Syria be Achieved?

Despite these tensions, the opportunity for diplomatic progress is genuine. The UNSC is no longer split along rigid pro- and anti-Assad lines. Regional actors—from Ankara to the Gulf capitals—are tired of endless conflict and are reengaging. International aid flows, while still limited, have begun to expand. For the first time in nearly fifteen years, Syria’s future is not predetermined.

But windows can close as quickly as they open. Al-Sharaa’s government must decide whether to seize the chance for international normalization, even if that means confronting uncomfortable compromises. And the Security Council must decide whether perfection is the enemy of progress.

If both sides fail, Syria risks entering a new cycle: a post-Assad era defined not by reconstruction and reconciliation, but by suspicion and missed opportunities.

If they succeed, they might finally achieve what was unthinkable under al-Assad: a coordinated international effort to rebuild a broken country.

Nearly a year after al-Assad’s fall, the question remains: will Syria’s new beginning be allowed to take root? Or will global mistrust—now wearing a different face—block the path once again?

Dr Kasia A. Houghton is a Research Fellow at the University of St Andrews with the Global Fragmentation project at the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep). Her research focuses on the changing nature of peacemaking and peacebuilding. She is the editor of China, Russia, and the USA in the Middle East: The Contest for Supremacy and holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of St Andrews.